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A Millian Objection to Reasons
as Evidence
G U Y F L E T C H E R
University of Edinburgh
INTRODUCTION
Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star have recently proposed the following
theory of reasons:
Reasons as Evidence: Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A
to  iff F is evidence that A ought to  (where  is either a belief or
an action).1
In this article I present an objection, inspired by Mill’s proof of the
principle of utility, to the right-to-left reading of the biconditional. My
claim is that the fact that you can perform some action can be evidence
that you ought to do it without, itself, being a reason to do it. If this is
true then Reasons as Evidence is false.2
MILL’S PROOF
In chapter 4 ofUtilitarianism, Mill argues for the hedonistic theory that
pleasure alone is desirable. He claims that the only evidence that can
be given for the view is that we desire pleasure alone.3 One charitable
way of reading Mill’s argument is as combining the principle referred
to as ‘Ought Implies Can’ with the claim that we can only desire
pleasure in order to conclude that pleasure alone is desirable (given
that assumption that something is desirable).
Mill’s argument suggests an interesting kind of challenge to Reasons
as Evidence. If the fact that you can  in C is evidence that you ought
to  in C then, according to Reasons as Evidence, the fact that you can
 in C is a reason to in C. This is prima facie problematic. Even those
who think reasons come cheaply (that we have many more reasons than
we usually report and more than we often believe or take ourselves to
have) will baulk at the idea that you have a reason to  in C simply
1 S. Kearns and D. Star, ‘Reasons: Explanations or Evidence?’, Ethics 119 (2008),
pp. 31–56.
2 J. Brunero, ‘Reasons and Evidence One Ought’, Ethics 119 (2009), pp. 538–45, also
argues against the right-to-left reading of Reasons as Evidence, using examples such as
the fact that there is no reason not to .
3 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1861).
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because you can  in C.4 And notice that Reasons as Evidence would
not only be committed to the claim that when you can perform some
action then there is a reason to do it. Rather, it would be committed to
the claim that this fact – that you can perform the action – is a reason
to do it (in any case where ability to  is evidence that one ought to ).
It is tempting to hold that the fact that you can  is never, itself, a
reason to .5 However, for my purposes, I do not need to defend that
claim. Here I claim only that there is at least one case where being able
to  in C is not a reason to  in C, whilst nonetheless being evidence
that you ought to  in C. I describe such a case below. Those who hold
Reasons as Evidence must reply to the case in one of two ways. They
must either (a) deny that being able to  is evidence that you ought to
 in this case or (b) hold that being able to  is a reason to  in this
case.
CAN THE ABILITY TO  BE EVIDENCE THAT YOU
OUGHT TO ?
If an agent is unable to perform some action then it is not the case
that she ought to perform that action.6 This is a gloss on the principle
ought-implies-can and some version of the principle seems undeniable
for at least the kinds of ought claims relevant here, which are practical
ought claims.7 If we denied this principle we would be left seemingly
unable to explain why it is not true that I ought to bring about world
peace by clicking my fingers.8 An analogous principle holds for reasons.
I have no reason to use my microwave to travel back in time and bring
about the early discovery of penicillin. The best explanation for this is
the fact that I cannot perform this action.
Given that ought implies can, your being unable to  is conclusive
evidence that it is not the case that you ought to. If you know that you
cannot perform some action then you know that it is not the case that
you ought to perform that action. Because this is true, it is plausible
4 Hereafter I sometimes omit the ‘in C’ clause, for brevity.
5 Putative counterexamples to this are nearly always cases that look to be handled
by a pragmatic alternative explanation.
6 Note that the relevant claim is: it is not the case that they ought to perform the
action. It is not that: they ought not to perform the action.
7 The kinds of ought claims plausibly constrained by ought-implies-can are what are
sometimes called ‘deliberative’, ‘agential’ or ‘practical’ ought claims. These are the only
ought claims I discuss herein. For discussion of the different varieties of ‘ought’ see
M. Chrisman, ‘ “Ought” and Control’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2012), pp.
433–51; M. Schroeder, ‘Ought, Agents, and Actions’, Philosophical Review 120 (2011),
pp. 1–41; and R. Wedgwood, ‘The Meaning of “Ought”’, Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1
(2006), pp. 127–60.
8 This type of argument is one used by B. Streumer, ‘Reasons and Impossibility’,
Philosophical Studies 136 (2007), pp. 351–84.
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to hold that – on at least some occasions – being able to  is evidence
that one ought to .9
I grant that it does not always follow from P’s implying Q that
Q is evidence that P. For whether some fact is evidence for another
fact is dependent upon the background facts, and presumably there
could be unusual cases in which being able to perform some action is
evidence that it is not the case that one ought to perform the action.10
Nevertheless, if there is any case in which being able to  is evidence
that one ought to  without at the same time being a reason to , then
Reasons as Evidence is in trouble. In this vein, consider the following
example:
Bone Marrow: A renowned scientist, close to developing technology
that would reverse climate-change a century from now, needs a bone-
marrow transplant. A hospital informs you that you are the only
possible remaining candidate to be a bone-marrow donor and asks if
you would mind being screened. You agree to be screened. You later
find out that you are a match.
My contention is that in this case your being able to donate bone marrow
to the scientist is evidence that you ought to donate bone marrow to
the scientist without being a reason to do so.
Can Reasons as Evidence take Horn A to avoid the case? Horn A was:
(a) Deny that being able to  is evidence that you ought to  in this
case.
This reply is implausible. In this case the stakes were such that you
knew that you ought to donate your bone marrow if you were a match.
You also knew that if you were unable to donate, this would be decisive
evidence that it was not the case that you ought to donate. So when you
discovered that you are in fact a match, you acquired evidence that you
ought to donate your bone marrow to the scientist. Thus, Reasons as
Evidence cannot avoid this case by denying that ability was evidence
in this case.
Can Reasons as Evidence take Horn B? Horn B was:
(b) Hold that being able to  is a reason to  in this case.
But this reply is implausible too. In discovering that you were able to
donate bone marrow to the scientist you did not discover additional
reasons to do so. You already knew what reasons there would be
9 Of course it will not often, if ever, be decisive evidence that one ought to , but it
can still be some evidence that one ought to .
10 It might even be evidence that one ought not to perform the action.
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to donate (the climate-change and subsequent suffering that would
be prevented) if it turned out that you could donate. If, before the
screening, you were asked what reasons you would have to donate,
should you turn out to be a match, it would be false to include among
them the fact that you would be able to donate (even though this was
evidence that you ought to donate). Reasons are facts that count in
favour of actions whereas the fact that you can perform an action is,
in and of itself, normatively neutral. If my claims about the case are
correct then Bone Marrow is a case in which the fact that you can  is
evidence that you ought to but not, itself, a reason to, pace Reasons
as Evidence.
A general feature of Reasons as Evidence – one which explains
the difficulty it has with Bone Marrow and why such a problem
is generalizable – is that it cannot allow reasons to have enabling
conditions whose obtaining is evidence that an agent ought to .
On the Reasons as Evidence view, such enabling conditions must,
themselves, be reasons.11 But ability to  is an enabling condition of
reasons to  and so can be evidence that one ought to  without being
a reason to .12
guy.fletcher@ed.ac.uk
11 On discussion of this see Brunero, ‘Reasons and Evidence One Ought’, and K. Setiya,
‘What is a Reason to Act?’, Philosophical Studies (forthcoming). For discussion of the
reasons/enablers distinction, and its denial (the ‘No Background View’, in Schroeder’s
terms), see J. Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford, 2004), ch. 3, and M. Schroeder,
Slaves of the Passions (Oxford, 2007), ch. 2.
12 Many thanks to Debbie Roberts, Alex Gregory, Daniel Star, Jonathan Way, and
anonymous referees for comments and discussion.
